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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In recent years the extent of regulation has been ie 
in a number of industries, including among others airlinJs, lt
railroads, telephones, cable television, and hydrocarbon pro�u
This trend toward deregulation can be expected to continue � 
industries, and extended in others, such as motor carriale. 
Deregulation measures alone cannot guarantee that marketJ will 
perform in a competitive fashion. Thus, an increased reliaJce 
antitrust policy is inevitable. 
i 
sened II ckbro 
ers. 
hese 
on 
This paper focuses on new trends and problems thati wlll 
I I confront antitrust enforcers as a result of deregulation. ]t 
emphasizes those problems that are either new or take on moJe
significance because of deregulation, rather than reiteratijg 
known problems often treated in a number of textbooks on l anJit 
ell 
ust. 
We draw numerous examples from industries most likely to l be laffecte 
by deregulation. Since no single form of deregulation can be �iewJ I 
as typical, the role of antitrust will vary from one ind�st� Ito 
another. 
If any single theme has emerged as dominant, i� is tlhis: 
The most complex problems will arise in those industries in l wttich 
deregulation is partial. In these cases, the social control df an 
industry creates policy problems that may find neither Jutull 
exclusion nor collective exhaustion in the course of reJu1ahidn and 
rs, 
ii 
antitrust .  In short, there is. a danger that regulators and antitrust 
enforcers will fight over j urisdiction in some important matters , 
while other important problems receive the attention of neither. 
We have pointed to a number of areas in which this 
uncomfortable possibility may occur . First ,  who will scrutinize 
the price at which one firm sells goods or services to an affiliated 
firm, especially when only one of the firms is regulated? Second, 
who will determine when a price in a regulated market is predatory 
or otherwise anticompetitive , particularly if the firm charging 
that price also serves a regulated market? Third, what will be the 
boundary of antitrust innnunity? Fourth, under what conditions will 
a merger involving a firm serving both regulated and unregulated 
markets be allowed, and who specifies these conditions? .And fifth, 
who will decide when a refusal to serve is illegal, particularly if 
the sale in question involves both regulated and unregulated firms ? 
In the text we have suggested circumstances in selected industries 
under which each of these dilennnas might actually occur . 
Whether deregulation is partial or not ,  the first task 
of antitrust enforcers will be to de�ermine whether structural 
change is required to prevent the exercise of unchecked economic 
power by firms now unaccountable to regulators . Structural change 
may be necessary to foster competitive markets , particularly where 
regulation has created highly concentrated markets . .Antitrust 
enforcers must expect two new types of defense: (1) that the large 
market shares for which structural relief is sought was thrust 
upon existing firms by regulators , and. (2) that structural relief 
iii 
is unnecessary , since deregulation will by itself natura]ly erdde 
the market shares of larger firms . I 
We have also emphasized that antitrust enforcemen, will 
encounter a number of practices antithetic to the creatiln and
maintenance of competitive markets , practices that are dlepJy 
ingrained in the fabric of the industries being deregulabed . I t 
will not be easy for antitrust to overcome the inertia of decattes 
of sanctioned collusion and monopoly .  Some of the instihutJon
at the heart of the regulated system must be eliminated litJ 
deregulation, including domestic rate bureaus in transpoktaJio
industries where price and entry are decontrolled . EvenlthJn 
antitrust enforcers must watch closely to ensure that be avlorl is
independent, especially where other institutions , such ak 
international conferences , continue to exist . 
Finally, antitrust enforcers must constantly watcn fbr 
any obstacles that impede free entry where free entry is l deJirable . 
Deregulation by fiat does not guarantee free entry in fact.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been a wave of effort to lessen 
the extent to which certain industries have been regulated. The 
broad label applied to this movement is deregulation. It has 
affected airlines, stockbrokers , railroads,  motor carriers , 
telephone companies , cable television and hydrocarbon producers ,  
among other industries. To date deregulation has been widely 
implemented in some industries (e.g . ,  s tockbrokerage) , and quite 
limited in others (e.g., railroads). It has been formalized in 
some cases (e.g., natural gas) , and only proposed in others (e.g., 
motor carriers). In short ,  there is no single form or extent of 
deregulation that can truly be called typical. 
In the United States antitrust and regulation are two 
very important policy instruments for controlling industries that do 
not perform well absent government intervention.1 Where intervention
is required, the tools of antitrust are typically the first selected 
if competitive markets can be forged with their use. Where that is 
not possible, regulation provides a second line of control. 
While deregulation may result in a number of benefits , 
it may not always lead to the initiation and maintenance of 
effective competition. New and innovative approaches to antitrust 
may be required, even in those areas of antitrust that are rather 
traditional in presently unregulated sectors. 
2 
This question becomes even more important when one 
realizes that virtually every maj or aspect of regulation is 
antithetic to antitrust policy. Under some forms of regulat�on 
firms meet through institutions such as rate bureaus to dlsclss 
'•riff propoaala op•uly. Th•y alao of,en agr•e 'o �rk•< l •hjri•g 
or market splitting arrangements for which they seek regulatJry 
sanction. They have frequently sought and received permibsiJn �o I  
effect mergers that would most surely not have been allowed in 
unregulated markets. l These kinds of interfirm activities are well en renched 
after decades of regulation. With deregulation, antitrusb mly be 
called on to take an especially hard stance against these ac�ivlities 
in order to foster the independent behavior that will be reqli 
for competitive markets. Even that may not be enough. Fbr 1x ple,
tl>e crea,ion of a �mp•,i<ive �k•' �iro��' in a gij� ln �'� 
may not only require a cessation of a trend toward mergeJs, iu evel
a r•v�aal. Th• r�k of �'''�' will �' b• �Y here, eaie iall� 
since firms may enter a defense of prior regulatory sancoionl a ainsl 
such an action. 
The role of antitrust in a deregulated environnientl i� by
no means a clear one. It will obviously depend on the fdrm that 
deregulation takes in each industry, an issue discussed jn s�lction 
three. The role of antitrust is not clear even now, as Jhe 
deregulatory movement unfolds, nor was it before the wavl o 
deregulation began. History shows that the boundary be�een 
regulatory and antitrust j urisdictions has never been colplJte�y 
--·-·-·--"·lllfl----- -
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delineated , as we describe more fully in section two . Deregulation 
will not eliminate the narrow and awkward description of that 
boundary; it will merely shift the battleground in every case in 
which a portion of the industry remains regulated. In section 
three we show that this issue will require resolution in a number 
of industries. 
We then turn our attention to those areas where the burden 
on antitrust will probably be the greatest with deregulation. In 
section four we address some of the problems that can be expected 
in the areas of monopoly .  In section five we examine the kinds of 
problems that will confront antitrust enforcers in the areas of 
horizontal restraints and oligopoly, including pricing issues. In 
section six we address other aspects, including vertical restraints 
and mergers, and then briefly summarize some of our more important 
findings in section seven. 
We have chosen not to emphasize many of the traditional 
issues that have been addressed in the vast literature on antitrust . 
A repetition of these issues would not further our purpose here, 
especially given the numerous excellent treatises in the field, 
including Areeda (1974) , Kaysen and Turner (1959), Scherer (1970), 
Weiss (1967), and Bork (1978). 
We also do not attempt to reiterate the many arguments for 
and against deregulation in the various industries to which we will 
refer, except where those arguments specifically relate to the 
issues to be encountered in the enforcement of antitrust policy. Rather , 
we will focus on issues which are either new or taken on a larger 
significance as a result of deregulation. That task alone Wil 
prove challenging enough. 
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2. ANTU'RUST AND REGULATION: A STUDY IN CONFLICT 
It is true that government activities influencl eve 
unregulated markets in many ways. For example, the govelnmlnt 
controls import tariffs and quotas, regulates the money luplly1, 
levies taxes, controls governmental expenditures on goodl ald 
services, enforces contracts, and determines minimum wagls . I  'llhese 
actions affect virtually all markets. 2
By contrast , in markets within the regulated s�ctor lof 
the economy, the government intervenes as a referee to Jffelt• lthe 
v�y heart of the meChani� that allooate• reao�oe• . 3 �e l 1'lve1' 
of prices, quality of service,  investment in plant , or �rofit� may 
be controlled . Firms may legally disseminate data aboud prlces 
and levels of output, and may engage in j oint efforts td in�luence 
government sanctions of the same. Entry into and exit 11roJ mlrkets 
may be limited. Price discrimination may be sanctioned by le ulat� 
authorities, and , as mentioned earlier, mergers that might lot be 
allowed in unregulated markets may be approved under reJu1Jti@n. 
A number of kinds of activities may be allowed under reJu1Jti�n tha 
would otherwise be illegal.  
The rationale for regulation has been described iin•ljlany 
plaoea in Che literature, and need not be reiterated in an, d>tail 
here. 4 The reason most often cited from an economic pe�spectlve i
5 
the natural monopoly argument. A natural monopoly is said to exist 
in markets in which "the minimum optimal scale of production is so 
large that there is room in a given market for only one or at most 
very few firms realizing all production and distribution economies 
of scale. 1 15 Thus, the argument goes, a single supplier (or a few
suppliers) would be able to serve the entire market at a lower cost 
per unit of output than if there were many competing suppliers. 
Since the preservation of a competitive market is made difficult by 
the nature of production technology in such a case, an exclusive 
franchise is granted and monitored under regulation. 
There are other potential justifications for regulation. 6
Regulation may be used to dampen the effects of economic fluctuations 
on certain markets, to subj ect the effects of changes in the economic 
environment to approval by administrative process instead of an 
impersonal market mechanism, or to deal with conditions that might 
arise from incomplete information in a market. Other possible 
reasons have included the redistribution of income by controlling 
the extent to which price discrimination is allowed, or by requiring 
one service to subsidize another . These restribution schemes often 
require limited entry so that firms cannot enter only the lucrative 
parts of regulated markets and thereby reap the rewards of 
creamskimming. In addition it is sometimes argued that regulation 
prevents windfall profits, and allows regulators to adjust for 
externalities that may exist when firms and consumers do not base 
their actions on all of the social costs and benefits associated with 
a market. 
6 
For whatever reasons an industry may have been fregul 
enforcement of the antitrust laws in this country has historlc4lly 
been quite limited in regulated industries. As Areeda h1s jot�d, 
" • where there is natural monopoly there is little rlasol 
ted 
antitrust policy except insofar as (1) the maintenance oJ molo 
ceases to be inevitable or (2) power in the monopoly arel rJdi I 
outward into areas where competition is both possible and 
desirable. 117
or 
oly 
tes 
The Interface Between A Regulated An An Unregulated Sector, 
If an entire industry were a natural monopoly , thJn 
the tasks confronting both regulators and enforcers of antiJrust 
would be simpler than they often are. A typical example l of !such a 
monopoly would be a local electric utility, whose services are  
provided largely without competition from other services of fer�d b� . I unregulated companies. Regulators have more complete control bver 
such a monopoly than they would if unregulated rivals prbviJedl a 
service that would be a substitute; antitrust concerns ilself �ess 
with injury to the nonexistent rivals, since regulators lavl 
j urisdiction over the entire existing industry. l However, the boundary between regulated and unreg la�ed 
sectors is not always so clear. For example, regulated lailro�ds 
of ten face competition from unregulated barges or from ar 
unregulated sector of the motor carrier industry .
8 Regu[ated 
telephone companies now face competition in the manuf act1lriig lof 
terminal equipment and in the provision of domestic long dibtance 
__ , ___ .,JULI----
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private line communication services. 9 And until the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978 ,  regulators of interstate wellhead sales of 
natural gas had no j urisdiction over intrastate sales, and could 
not force producers to direct gas supplies to the less lucrative 
10 interstate markets . In such cases as these, regulators have
found that their control over the. industry is much less extensive 
because of competition from an unregulated sector . Similarly, 
enforcers of antitrust may be concerned that the performance of 
the unregulated sector is spmehow impaired by the regulated sector. 
The movement toward deregulation has in instances such as 
those just mentioned been expedited by increased interdependence 
among markets at the boundary between regulated and unregulated 
sectors. 11 Where competition at the fringe has proven viable, the
natural monopoly argument for regulation has been questioned, with 
the consequent suggestion that many of the resource allocation 
decisions previously made by regulators might better be made through 
an unregulated market .  
Since deregulation will move, but not eliminate the 
interface between regulated and unregulated sectors, questions of 
implied immunity, primary and exclusive j urisdiction, and state 
action will continue to await resolution. Historically, the arm 
of antitrust has found jurisdiction in some regulated industries, 12
not so in others, 13 and has found ambiguous stature in yet other
14 cases. 
8 
At still another level the extent of the role of antf trus 
r�ins �e•olv"'. Specifioally, when doe• the (legal) u•J o thj 
administrative process of regulation differ from the (illegll) abud 
of that process?15 Under what circumstances, if any, cai tJe 
antitrust statutes be used to limit the extent to which l 
particular interest group engages in lobbying or other altivit�es 
to delay proceedinge or to deter the intere•te of other �oJ,,� In 
two cases decided in the early 1960s, the Supreme Court kpplarbd td 
eliminate abuse of process as a Sherman Act violation, blseJ ob 
:immunity implied by the First Amendment. 16 More recentl� , Jhcl Cou1 
has held that there are some abuses of the administrativk plocess 
that do constitute antitrust violations, including the khowlng! 
. 17 I I . submission of false data to a regulatory authority, ana the. 
concerted and repeated effort of an interest group to us� llt:ijgatio: 
18to deter entry . 
In short ,  
While i t  is obvious 
from the domain of 
a number of legal issues remain undecided. 
that deregulation will �e ·�of rheli"'u� 
regulation into that of antitrust, the natulre 
of the problems at the interface will remain. 
3 .  THE TREND TOWARD DEREGULATION 
As noted in section one, the term deregulatiol has claken 
on a number of different meanings,  depending on the industr} !iln 
question. In this section we briefly give context to iJs mla*ing 
for a number of industries that have recently been or aje sboa like 
9 
to be the target of some type of deregulation. We reiterate that 
the exact form of deregulation is not yet known fully in any of 
these industries. Even those for which statutes have been passed 
(for example, natural gas) will require a number of regulatory 
judgments and procedural specifications not known at the present 
time. Nevertheless, the general spirit of the deregulation 
movement in each case can be described in this section, allowing us 
to discuss some of the potential problems and issues relevant to the 
future of antitrust in subsequent sections. 
Airline Service 
Starting in 1975; the CAB began to relax its tight grip 
on the levels of air fares. It followed a gradual path toward rate 
freedom to the maximum extent consistent with its mandate to 
19 regulate, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 .  A wave of tariff 
reductions swept across the industry beginning in 1977 and 
accelerating in 1978 . 20 At the conclusion of 1977,  both entry into
and tariffs on commercial air freight transportation were 
decontrolled by statute, with a proviso that future tariffs for 
freight service would not be predatory. The notion of a predatory 
price was not defined by statute. Deregulation of air passenger 
service has now been enacted with the Airline Deregulation Act ,  
basically designed to decontrol both rates and entry. 21 As w e  shall 
see in section five, there are several important aspects of entry 
that will determine whether a deregulated air industry will lead 
to vigorous competition. For the present we observe that f�e 
entry by fiat need not imply that free entry will in falt �i$t; 
as a corollary it follows that deregulation by fiat may lnoj 
automatically lead to a vigorously competitive market . 
Natural Gas 
Following a number of proposals to deregulate natural 
gas during the 1970s, Congress successfully enacted the Najural 
Gas Policy Act of 1978 . 22 The NGPA gradually deregulates J 
category of natural gas called "new" natural gas producld Jt the 
wellhead, with total decontrol of wellhead prices occurlinJ after 
1985. 23 j It is significant to note that regulation wil remain 
in force for large segments of the natural gas industryj iJclvding 
the prices of gas not designated as new gas (i. e . , "oldll gJs) 
the pipeline' that tr�'port g� from the field to loca ,.J,�ta, 
and the ln<al utilitie' that distribute the g� to cu,al..,, .  4 
As we shall see in section five, the interface between lnregulated 
producers and the regulated pipelines may pose some intlrejti:llg an 
difficult problems to both regulators and enforcers of �tJtrust. 
Oil Prices 
Like prices for natural gas, domestic oil prides have 
been held below the price on the world market for a numJer lof lyear 
At the start of 1979 approximately 30 percent of the doJestjic¥lly 
11 
produced oil was subjected to a ceiling of about $6 per 
barrel of crude oil; the balance will be priced at about $14 per 
barrel, and that is well below the current price of oil on the world 
market.25
In his nationally televised speech on energy on 
April 5 ,  1979 , President Carter announced his intention to 
deregulate the price of all domestic oil, with successive steps of 
decontrol being completed by perhaps 1981. This form of deregulation 
differs markedly from the deregulation of natural gas, since old 
natural gas would remain regulated even after 1985. The President 
has announced plans to propose to Congress a windfall profits tax 
to prevent oil producers from realizing the large supernormal 
profits that would result with deregulation absent the tax. At 
this writing the exact form of the proposed windfall profit tax is not 
clear. 
Motor Carriers 
Although no statute has been passed with respect to 
motor carriers, there is a clear movement afoot to seek deregulation 
of that portion of the interstate motor carrier industry that is 
now regulated. Approximately 46 percent of the ton-miles of 
intercity freight carried by the trucking industry is regulated 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission presently. Another ten percent 
is regulated by intrastate agencies, with the balance being 
unregulated.26 When deregulation is discussed in connection with
the motor carrier industry, it usually refers to freedom of entry in 
12 
the carriage of any commodity over any route at unregulated tariff 
Railroads 
Although the complete deregulation of railroads, linblud� 
the removal of all tariff and entry restrictions, has nbt nee I I . 
seriously discussed as a part of the recent wave of der�gulat�on, 
certain elements of railroad regulation have been relaxld. I The 
passage of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Rlfotm �ct o• 
1976 , (the Quad-R Act) is most notable in this respect. �o 
other things, this Act in principle allows a railroad to vlr� its
tariffs within a "zone of reasonableness" without obtaihin� 
approval from the Interstate Commerce Commission, absenb a l filndin 
of the ICC that the railroad has "market dominance." 
While one might have expected railroads to aller l t  
rates given this new flexibility, in particular by lowering 
wh�• <hey f�e in<e�oda.l •�pe<i<i=, no n� r�h of ra,l 
readj ustments has followed the passage of the Act. In [acl , las 
Nels= •h�, " • • •  railroad• have b�n very can<io"' rbol<
J
takin. 
advantage of the • • • Act during the first 18 months o.r sb f iJ 
validity.1127 
Telephones 
Two maj or areas of the telephone industry previors+y 
monopolized by regulated telephone companies have been opened to 
entry in the last decade. The two areas include the suppl� df 
terminal equipment and the provision of long distance Jrivkte line 
transmission. The decision of the Federal Communications 
13 
Commission to allow competition in the supply of terminal equipment 
has been sustained by the courts, the primary remaining restriction 
being that the equipment is of a type certified as acceptable by 
the Commission. 28
The long distance private line market cannot yet be 
described as competitive, although some entry has occurred. Both 
rates and entry remain regulated in this market . 
The Congress is now engaged in an effort to rewrite the 
Communications Act of 1934 to reflect the existence of a number of 
new technologies (e . g . , fiber optics, satellites, and microwave 
systems) that have arisen since the Act was passed over forty 
years ago . It may very well be that more competition in various 
areas of the telephone industry will result from that effort. 
To be sure, several other industries marked by some 
relaxation in regulatory restraint could be added to this list, 
including cable television, 29 banking, 30 securities markets, 31
and water carriage . 32 The main point of even this partial enumeration
is to show how deregulation can vary across industries, and to 
provide a background against which to assess the role of antitrust 
in the future. 
4. MONOPOLY 
One of the most often cited reasons for the implementation 
of a regulatory scheme, as described in section two, is the 
prevention of the unfettered exercise of monopoly power, especially 
14 
when technology precludes the competitive coexistence of ailatge 
number of firms. If deregulation is to succeed, it musb dd s
least in part because the industry or part of an indust� jha
deregulated is not a natural monopoly .  In some of thesl iJdu
a single firm or a few firms have managed to achieve lalgetma 
at 
is 
tri 
I , 
shares under regulation. This brings us to the first of tlie 
that antitrust must face with deregulation: 
How Will Antitrust Deal With Firms That Have Gained 
Large Market Shares Under Regulatory Sanction? ! 
In raising this question, we recognize that the 
application of antitrust to firms with large market shales lin I 
ket 
ssu 
1 an: unregulated industries has changed over the years, and is �ti 
issue w<thout elear r�olution. As ree�tly as J��ry l l919 ,  
the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and 
Procedures recommended to the President and the Attornei GJneral I 
that "a proviso be added to the end of Sherman Act Section l 2  
order t o  clarify the appropriate standards" for determiling I 
.n 
whether a firm has attempted to monopolize an industry.33 
Our purpose here is not to attempt a treatise l on l th 
comparative merits of � se and rule of reason interpretatiiohs oft 
the Sherman Act , a traditional issue of antitrust, but latJerl to 
ask whether firms in industries j ust deregulated or in 1 tjan itio
to a deregulatod state will be tr�ted in the sa� way ls ,ir ij 
histori�ll y =«gulated ind� tri� . At the two �trjs ant · trn, 
agencies could attempt to break up firms with very largl mJrk t slikoces 
15 
as soon as deregulation is enacted (consistent with the structural 
34 approach of antitrust since Alcoa ), or they could adopt a temporary 
wait-and-see attitude· to find out whether deregulation measures 
alone are sufficient to induce a competitively performing industry. 
They could also pursue an intermediate stance, depending on the 
political climate, including the extent of antitrust enforcement 
activity tolerated by Congress, the availability of suitable remedies 
under existing legislation, and the possibility of obtaining new 
remedies with new legislation. If antitrust agencies do attempt 
to break up large firms, they may have to deal with the following issue. 
Will A "Thrust Upon" Argument Be A Valid Defense? 
We recall that in the Alcoa case the possibility of a 
"thrust upon" defense in a monopolization case was raised. In 
Alcoa the issue was whether Alcoa had achieved a monopoly in the 
ingot market by actions to exclude its competitors, or whether 
monopoly had been thrust upon Alcoa by virtue of its "superior 
skill, foresight, and industry." Although the Court found that 
monopoly had not been thrust upon Alcoa's lap, the Court did leave 
open the possibility that a thrust upon defense might be valid 
against a charge of monopolization. 
A variation of this defense may very well occur with 
deregulation, since a firm previously regulated might argue that 
its large share of a market was thrust upon it by regulation. 
While such an argument is not only possible, but perhaps inevitable 
with deregulation, it will be of utmost importance that antitrust 
enforcement overcome this defense. Otherwise, the functioning 
of these markets will be checked by neither regulation nor antitrust. 
Partial Deregulation: Immunity And The Interf4ce 
As noted in section three, in several industrJes Ith present movement is toward partial rather than completejdereg 
In those cases the distinction between the regulated an u�e 
activities in an industry may be narrow and awkward. IJ ma� 
obvious where antitrust immunity exists under the regullto� 
'"""r•lla, p�tinularly if an indu•try i• nontinually injrojl' 
new services or products that require a determination of juri 
Two examples may help to illustrate this poinJ. �i 
consider the present movement in the telephone industry Ito lal 
competition in the provision of long distance private line 
teleconnnunication services. At present this activity rjmains 
regulated, although the Federal Communications CommissiJn Jas 
decided to allow entry at regulated tariffs.35 
16 
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dicti� 
st, 
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Although the FCC allowed entry into private line 'matkets, 
it wanted to retain a monopoly status for the traditionll Jon 
distance "message toll service" (MTS) markets. In fact whl the 
entrants into the private line markets have attempted to iJtr$duce 
n•w ••�in" that, in th• opini� of th• FCC, too nlo••ly Ji'f ble 
the MTS services of the established telephone carriers, the F C 
has attempted to reject those offerings. 36 However, on applea , 
the courts have reversed the FCC and denied the notion thaJ MTS 
37 should be granted the standing of a natural monopoly. 
The point is this. With deregulation, antitrust 'en
f 
orcerl 
may find themselves confronted with unregulated markets thJt 
j
ave 
nontrivial interactions with regulated markets. The classjc 
17 
questions arise. What is the relevant market? Does regulatory 
action in one area supersede antitrust action in a closely related 
but unregulated market? 
It is natural to hope that, with well designed deregulation 
measures, problems like the one above will be minimal. But it would 
be naive to believe they will be nonexistent. 
The second example is drawn from the railroad industry. 
As described in section three, the Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 allows railroads to change prices 
within zones of reasonableness without ICC approval, as long as the 
ICC does not determine the firm to have market dominance over a 
particular commodity. This suggests that under partial deregulation, 
a regulatory commission may take on the role of an antitrust enforcer. 
The recent United States Senate Committee on Government Affairs' 
Study on Federal Regulation commented on this as follows: 
In other words, if the ICC determines that a railroad 
is dominant over a particular commodity, full rate 
regulation would be maintained. The statute attempts 
directly to answer one of the main concerns of those 
opposed to deregulation: The possible abuse 0£ 
monopoly power. The ICC therefore assumes the role 
of antitrust enforcer.38 
Thus the role of antitrust enforcement may take on a new 
character with deregulation. The cast of public representatives 
may be expanded beyond the Department of Justice and the Federal 
is Trade Commission to include regulatory agencies themselres. increased division of responsibilities may actually increaJe
immunity of a partially deregulated industry from antitlusJ a he tacl<i 
from sources outside a regulatory agency. 
How Will Antitrust Deal With Refusals To Serve1• 
Where regulation grants an exclusive franchisb, it 
usually imposes a common carrier obligation on the recilieJt bf 
that franchise. This obligation typically states that bhe lfi! I . required to serve all customers who demand service under the  
is 
conditions stated in existing tariffs. Thus, customers will be 
assured of receiving service even though a single company; lorl in � 
case like the airlines, a few companies have charge of lro4uc�ng 
that service.  As deregulation occurs in airlines, parts of the l tellepho 
and railroad industries, and in the motor carrier
. 
indus�ry, e
common carrier obligation is likely to be removed from the 
deregulated portions of these industries. In some caseb, eusltomei:i 
may claim that their expectations for engaging in some bajbr 
enterprise, for example, the building of a plant, was blsel ! the 
expectation of the continued provision of a common carr[l·er l s ch � 
railroad transportation. I It should be noted that refusals to deal (or serve)I and
group boycott are well defined antitrust offenses. Hojevel, lwhere 
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partial deregulation occurs the role of antitrust may be delicate, 
particularly if a regulatory agency such as the ICC is acting as 
an antitrust enforcer in some areas as suggested earlier. Even 
without that complication the question is not easy to answer. 
Should provision service be required over some period of time 
until an otherwise deprived customer is able to make other 
arrangements? What if other arrangements are extremely costly? 
Will the court system be inundated with many antitrust grievances 
previously brought before regulators? 
Refusals to serve have long been an issue within 
regulated industries. When firms other than telephone companies 
attempted to gain the approval of the FCC for the attachment of 
customer terminal equipment that they manufactured, AT&T opposed 
this strongly. Customers using such terminal equipment encountered 
a great deal of resistance over a number of years before their 
right to network service was secured.39 As we noted in section 
three, the FCC decision to allow nontelephone companies to 
manufacture customer terminal equipment was in itself a form of 
partial deregulation. Enforcers of antitrust can expect more of 
this with the broadening of the deregulation movement. 
To be realistic, antitrust can no more hope to eliminate 
all pockets of monopoly power from deregulated markets than it has 
in historically unregulated markets. At best it can be hoped that 
the use of antitrust tools will minimize the extent of such economic 
power, and several characteristics of deregulated markets may make 
this task more difficult than in historically unregulated markets. 
These characteristics include initially highly concentrated 
the �tioipation of the thr�t up� defe�e, and the pol�ji 
barriers that limit the reach of antitrust where deregu�atio 
partial. 
5. HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS AND OLIGOPOLY 
In terms of relative numbers, the types of antitru� 
most often brought are those involving horizontal restrlinls.
Where no single firm can monopolize an industry, firms �y lh 
an incentive to conspire to monopolize an industry, usilg su 
tactics as price fixing and dissemination of data on oubpul,
shares, and prices. Where firms can collude, they may le lb
extract extranormal profits if they can restrict output ! to lb 
higher prices, just as an unregulated monopolist might re fi!xpl 
to do. 
The courts have not been sympathetic toward o�ert 
at collusion. In fact, price fixing is illegal � se, 
trade association activities designed to facilitate thel exeh 
of market share and price data.41 
However, most oligopoly cases do not involve overt , I 
,, 
I 
J 
rke1±' 
is 
cas 
rk' 
to 
ge 
collusion, and the courts have struggled for years over l the 
circumstances under which it may be possible to inf er colljsiwe 
aoti� fr� •uoh evid�oe � parallel prioing behavior.I�• 
nature of the dilemma confronting the courts has been s lri�ed 
clearly by Judge Medina in the Investment Banker's Case � 
True it is that conspiracies • • • are often hard to 
detect. No direct proof of agreement between the 
wrongdoers is necessary; circumstantial evidence 
of the illegal combination is here as elsewhere 
often most convincing and satisfactory. But, when 
all is said and done, it is the true and ultimate 
fact which must prevail. Either there is some 
agreement, combination or conspiracy or there is not. 
The answer must not be found in some crystal ball or 
vaguely sensed by some process of intuition, but in 
the evidence adduced in the record of the case which 
must be carefully sifted, weighed, and considered in 
its every aspect. This is an arduous but necessary 
task.42 
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One cannot expect the difficulties in detecting collusive 
behavior to be overcome soon. Regulation has created a number of 
structural conditions and practices that may prevent the emergence 
of effective competition, including equipment standards, credit 
terms, maintenance standards," and output quality standards, that 
may contribute to parallel behavior that is most difficult to 
prevent. In addition, in some cases regulation has created and 
sanctioned institutions, like rate bureaus, whose primary function is 
to assure conformity in some aspects of performance. 
How Effective Will Antitrust Be In The Wake Of Rate 
One of the interesting features of domestic tkanlpo
is the overt collusion among carriers in a given mode ih rlca: 
tariffs to regulators. These collective efforts are acbomJli 
through nonprofit organizations of the carriers known ak rlte' 
or conferences. 
hed 
bur 
These organizations date back into the last cent�ry1, 
and they have historically been viewed dimly by antitrukt 
enforcers. Indeed as Weiss and Strickland note, the fikst
collusion case brought under the Sherman Act and reachihg the 
Supreme Court involved the Trans-Missouri Freight AssaclatlaJ.43 
This organization consisted of eighteen railroads that bonJrollled 
traffic west of the Mississippi River, and the associatlan I 
, b attempted to set rates for all of its members. In stri�ing d wn 
this arrangement, the Court first enunciated its � se 
interpretation of the Sherman Act, that every restraint 
was illegal.44 
The practices of rate bureaus were again struck do' 
Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. in 1945, in which hhe lS 
Court found that Congress had not empowered the ICC to lxempt! I I railroad carriers from the Sherman Act.45 However, followin 
extensive hearings on the matter, Congress found much slpplrt 
bureaus from both shippers and carriers. In 1948 Congrlss I gri 
rate bureaus statutory exemption from the antitrust lawk by 
passing the Reed-Bulwinkle Act.46 This exemption has chntln
until today. The Railroad Revitalization and Regulate� Rlfa
de 
in 
for 
.nted 
d 
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Act of 1976 requires that bureaus cannot vote on rates for services 
provided by only one line and that only carriers that could engage 
in a joint line movement can vote on a joint line rate. Within 
this structure, then, rate bureau activities are immune from 
antitrust. 
Domestic rate bureaus are typically organized by geographic 
regions. There are ten railroad rate bureaus, eleven major rate 
bureaus for motor carriers, and several others for domestic water 
carriers. Additionally, international air carriers have their own 
organization to coordinate international fares, the International 
Air Transp�rt Association (IATA),47 and the Federal Maritime 
Commission has the power to.grant antitrust immunity to conferences 
48 among ocean carriers. 
The potential problems that rate bureaus pose amidst a 
movement toward deregulation are strongly apparent. The power to 
fix prices is antithetic to the functioning of a competitive 
market. It is no wonder then, that the National Commission for 
the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures has recommended to the 
President and the Attorney General that the Reed-Bulwinkle Act 
should be repealed,49 and that the antitrust exemptions granted 
to ocean shipping conferences should be examined closely and 
removed where there is excessive and unnecessary restraint of 
trade. 50 The abolition of rate bureaus is especially important 
where the total deregulation of pricing and entry is contemplated, 
as the case may be in the motor carrier industry. 
J 
and, 
The existence of international conferences poses la 
particularly difficult problem in public policy. On thl orte 
these conferences may facilitate the achievement of diplomJti
and national defense objectives. 51 Yet on the other, tiey 1ma· 
provide a means for participants to disseminate data an1 td ' 
o'henrlse engage in ac,ivi,iee 'ha' ha� effec'' � '"" l do�e markets that any of the participants may serve, for examplJ i
airlines industry. The role of antitrust will no doubt ldeJen 
ic 
the 
crucially on the circumstances particular to each industry. 
size In short, then, our discussion of rate bureauJ emth 
that deregulation measures alone will not necessarily llad to
independent behavior, especially since established firmJ ma 
have well developed mechanisms for communicating informJtiol 
detrimental to a competitive market performance. SimilJr1y1, 
antitrust enforcers must recognize that free entry by fJat need 
not lead to free entry in fact, a subject to which we nJw tlr 
Will Deregulation Lead To Free Entry? 
Free entry is of ten cited as necessary for perif ec!I 
competitive markets. Of course, in many of the industrJes inlwhicn 
deregulation is occurring, it is important to recognizejthab t ma� 
be desirable to require entrants to meet certain standa ds.I Hor 
example, no one has seriously argued that airline dereg latioj sho
include an abolition of safety standards for aircraft o� in t e us]I of airways. Similarly, few would suggest that standards of f·nanc 
responsibility should be abolished for insurance compan�es and bro�e�s. 
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In one sense, the existence of any such standards means 
that entry is not truly free. Yet in another, if anyone who is 
willing to satisfy these standards is allowed to enter by law, then 
a form of free entry exists. The important point to make here is that 
the legislation of free entry need not lead to free entry in fact. 
Where free entry is desirable, antitrust enforcers should pay 
particular attention to any features of a market that might deter 
entry, including the existence of large entry costs, excess capacity, 
and the potential of a multiproduct firm to extend monopoly power 
from a market that is regulated into another market that is deregulated. 
The notion of large entry costs is usually applied to 
situations in which very large capital requirements exist in order 
to enter, particularly if this results in economies of scale in 
production. Kahn has noted that in industries of this sort (for 
example, the local distribution of electric power or the local 
telephone exchange) destructive competition might result in the 
absence of regulation.52 Segments of industries that exhibit these 
characteristics are not good candidates for deregulation of both 
prices and entry, a statement largely reflected in the nature of 
the deregulation movement for the various industries discussed in 
section three. 
However, while the absence of large entry costs and 
economies of scale is a necessary condition for a competitive 
market performance, that absence is not sufficient. There may be 
institutional or historical reasons for which entry might not be 
ii 2f 
t=ly fr�. For �ple, in the air:llnes ind�try exi<tin8 i�ll 
have secured choice gate locations and time slots at mJjor a. rpor�!!llland 
established well developed schedules for connecting fl�ghts. Alt���
I 
gh 
the technological barriers to entry are relatively low [in bh s indlli!dtry, 
effective =m require• that l�ding righ" =be objaJd by J 
rivals, a problem most likely to arise in congested ailp+ 
At the present time it is not clear just how these 
landing rights will be made available to firms in the indul tf:. I� 
i• not euffioient to di"""' thi• c��t by eiEply eay�g rb. t ai� 
slots, including landing rights, will be auctioned off !in so e I 
undefined manner. Studies have shown that the structurie o� 
market = be etrongly influ=ced by the kind of �cti,n tl.t ie
conducted.53 The tenure of the landing rights that are pulc,ased, 
the relative '1m of the biddm, and the �ture of + +J,PJ 
network served by each bidder will also affect the performance 
ion 
t 
induced by any particular type of an auction.54 While a detailed 
discussion of auction processes is well beyond the scale Jf this 
pap�. antitr�t enforcer• •hnuld take an intereet in he reteJ.op 
of these institutional arrangements with deregulation, sincelthe 
"=cture and pedo�ce of certain -ke" _, be "f Jlylaff e�lied 
by whatever approach is ultimately chosen. For example, jt he t; 
of this writing, virtually no attention has been direcbed ltoward 
the mechanism by which air slots are to be allocated iJ cqngested 
airports. 
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Will Deregulation Introduce New Incentives For Predatory Pricing? 
Let us now turn our attention from entry to pricing. 
To be sure, any incentives for anticompetitive pricing that have 
existed in historically unregulated markets will also appear in 
unregulated markets. We have already discussed one form of 
anticompetitive pricing, price collusion. But now we address a 
second form, predatory pricing. 
Pricing that is predatory is not easy to define, as 
Areeda has noted. "It connotes conduct that has the purpose or 
effect of destroying or weakening a rival. But, of course, fair 
competition has the same objective: to prevail in the marketplace 
relative to rivals. 1155 The debate over what constitutes 
predatory pricing has been tortuous. Does it mean pricing below · 
marginal cost, average variable cost, or where profits are negative? 
If a measure of profits is to be used, how does one calculate the 
profits associated with a particular product, particularly if some 
of the costs incurred by the firm are shared by the product in 
question and other products? Even if a particular notion of costs 
or profits is deemed appropriate as a benchmark, it is of ten 
difficult to measure the relevant entity. 
Finally, a determination of predatory pricing often 
turns on whether the pricing practice prevails for a long time or 
a short time. If the latter, is a very low price viewed as simply 
promotional, or as an attempt to eliminate competitors, perhaps with 
the intent to raise prices later and to deter entry by a threat of 
a repeated introduction of a low price. 56 
I 2 
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to lexalnirte 
these issues for unregulated industries in any detail. I Wei dd note 
that there is generally less reason for concern over p1edato 
pricing in markets in which entry is relatively easy. Sup�ose the 
aim of predatory pricing is to drive out competitors td, crlaue 
market power, with the intent to raise the price later Ito kerterate 
supernormal profits. Then if entry is easy, supernormaJl pko�its 
cannot long prevail without signaling entry. 
This argument sets forth an additional reasoJ why enforce� should �ke s�e that oo large b�riers to �try [ r 
in deregulated industries. Incentives to engage in predator 
pricing are greatly reduced when entry is easy. 
Rather than focusing on these well known issues, 
.ntit" 
main 
main purpose of this section is to address a new kind o� pri 
issue that may be introduced with deregulation. Speciflcall�, we
refer to the case in which a firm serving a newly deregllaledlmarM' 
also provides services in another regulated market. Thl jjoi 
potential consequence of this situation is that a numbel ol the 
important pricing dilemmas that have long confronted reku1ltof s ma 
now be transferred to the courts, requiring resolution by lnt�truJ [ 
procedures. 
To further motivate this concern, we recall a l seniinal 
article by Averch and Johnson.57 They examined a situatioJ i 
which a regulated fi� pr�id� service both to a regulf t•� 
monopoly market and to a second market that might be opene� t 
t 
entry at unregulated prices. For example, a telephone company 
might provide service as a regulated monopolist in one market, 
and provide other services in unregulated markets (e.g., the 
supply of customer terminal equipment or the provision of long 
distance private line service). Averch and Johnson have shown 
that if such a firm is regulated by a rate of return constraint 
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applied collectively to all of the products of the firm, then the 
firm may have an incentive to price the competitive services 
below marginal cost in order to expand the rate base and thereby 
generate larger profits. 
This is notable because a completely unregulated firm 
would not have an incentive to run a long run loss in a market.58 
Yet a partially deregulated firm, one of whose markets is totally 
deregulated, might very well have an incentive to run a long 
run loss in a competitive market. 
Both the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Federal 
Communications Commission have spent nearly a decade trying to 
decide what criteria should be used to describe prices that are 
"fair, 1159 a task that has been complex even when all of the markets 
involved fell within the jurisdiction of a regulator. With partial 
deregulation, the task will now be split between regulators and 
antitrust enforcers. 
To summarize the point, economic theory has suggested 
that there may be long run incentives to price below marginal cost 
where a single firm serves both regulated and unregulated markets. 
11 
3 
Under virtually any definition, this would be viewed a� p�ed�tor� 
pricing. 
6 .  OTHER AREAS: VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND MERGERS 
To ho •�•. rho v�io� �••• of anrir�r ,l..ol ,Jlway� be neatly separated into mutually exclusive areas. Acjordin ly, l 
have already addressed certain issues relevant to bothflerlidal 
restraints and mergers. For example, in section four o mlnqpoly I we have already dealt at some length with one form of ertical 
restraint, refusals to deal, and need not repeat those issL[e 
here. 
In keeping with the tenor of the rest of this pa e+, we 
recognize that the traditional issues of vertical restjaiJt ddres 
in antitrust cases for historically unregulated marketJ wjll surell 
remain relevant in markets that are deregulated, incluJinJ p oblJ 
··· · J I . Iwith tying arrangements, exclusive dealing, and exclusive .fr nchi1 
We focus on other issues that
.
are perhaps less obviousj an� , re J 
directly associated with the deregulation movement. 
One of the most important problems of vertical rrs will •"-•• ar "'' inrorfao• b•tw•� rogularod �· doro�ul•r· Section 10 of the Clayton Act prohibits common carrierJ from
purchasing inputs without competitive bidding from comJanils 
whom they have interlocking directorates. As we see itj thlr
be at least two ways in which enforcement of this prov�siol 
very important with deregulation. 
rain_ I I mar' 
with 
will 
ill � 
d 
g. 
s.
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First, antitrust authorities should be alert to the 
possibility that a firm that is regulated in one of its markets 
may refuse to deal with any of the firms in a deregulated market 
other than its own affiliate . For example, if a telephone company 
maintains a monopoly in local exchange, and has an affiliate that 
produces telephone equipment, there may be an incentive for the 
local exchange company to restrict its purchases of equipment to 
its own affiliate. Of course, the restriction need not be complete . 
The point is that any such restriction forecloses a portion of the 
equipment market to competing supply firms. 
The potential problems of vertical restraint may go beyond 
foreclosure of the market. If the local exchange company is 
regulated by a rate of return, then it might not object to paying 
higher-than-competitive prices for equipment since these higher 
prices will be reflected in an inflated rate base and ultimately in 
higher profits for the local exchange company . The equipment supplier 
would also realize extranormal profits at these higher prices. This 
suggests that vertical relationships can lead to extranormal profits in 
partially deregulated industries; the problem has been formally 
analyzed by Dayan (1972).
A similar problem could arise in other industries. For 
example, consider the case of vertically integrated pipelines and 
suppliers of oil and gas. A pipeline might be willing to pay a 
higher-than-competitive price for, say, natural gas purchased from 
its own affiliate. The pipeline could pass these higher fuel costs 
along to customers under automatic fuel price adjustmenl' ---
1 often used by regulators, and the producers of gas woul rea 
.nis 
ze 
y supernormal profits on such sales. Thus, the existence of t m  
competing producers in wellhead markets may not guarant
l 
e thrut 
actual wellhead sales take place at competitive prices. loo 
The warning signals from these examples are !ear �nougW 
If regulators do not scrutinize these transfer prices osll: 
antitrust enforcers may be saddled with that responsibiiti . :J I The task will not be easy. To take only the two examples e hav 
�t�al ga• aupply con<x�ta are oft� c�plicated •o t�at ' a  
comparison of prices from one contract to another is nolt eas
the telephone example, there are very many different types l o
equipment whose prices would have to be examined . SincL the 
c�rent direction of the deregulation mov�nt will appf r.lt
to vertical affiliates that straddle the interface between lr 
and unregulated markets, the problems we have suggested! appe' 
to be both important and inevitable . 
The Merger Problem 
cite· 
Iii 
, lea:. I I ulat: 
I 
Before concluding, we turn to the topic of me�gers>I an 
area that will undoubtedly require the increased attentl.on l o 
antitrust enforcers with deregulation. Through their dlreet 
determination of market structure, mergers obviously aff ecb 
performance. It therefore requires no elaboration to ebphls 
the point that �y of the �rket •t�cture deciaio� pf �lo
made by regulators will be made in the antitrust arena wit� 
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deregulation. While merger decisions made by regulatory authorities 
have not been totally immune from antitrust attack, 61 there can be 
no doubt that the role of antitrust regarding mergers will be 
expanded with deregulation. 
The most difficult aspect of the merger problem, at 
least in some industries, is that the structure of the industry 
sanctioned under regulation may already be oligopolistic. Since at 
least 1950, with the passage of the Cellar-Kefauver Act, merger 
rulings in historically unregulated industries have largely attempted 
to nip oligopoly in its incipiency. It is much easier to prevent 
a merger that could lead to an oligopolistic development of an 
industry than to break up firms after an oligopolistic structure 
has been reached. Unfortunately, in historically regulated 
- .•. -.... ........._�1J.-.��4:..� .. 
industries, the structure of the industry may have long ago become 
highly concentrated. Thus the role of antitrust may be heavily 
oriented toward undoing the damage done by past mergers in order to 
create competitively structured markets. In some cases this may be 
difficult to do, particularly where firms involved have some parts 
that remain regulated while other parts are participants in 
deregulated markets. 
While these tasks may be difficult and somewhat different 
from the ones involving mergers in historically unregulated 
markets, the issues antitrust enforcers appear to be largely the 
same. The central question remains: How big do firms have to be 
in order to realize economies of scale in production, and will the 
size of the market permit enough of these efficiently sized firms to 
coexist so that a competitive structure can be reached?l Bec�Use I this central issue has not changed with deregulation, w do nbt 
dwell on the vol�ea of li<era<�e <ha< have a<<emp<ed f o l.�wer 
this question for each of the industries we described in slctaon 
three.62 
We ·close this section by drawing attention to l one ri 
interesting structural possibility that may arise with tlerlg 
It has most often been discussed in the transportation lndLt! . I but also may arise in the energy industry. We refer tol the 
possibility of the integrated transportation company.63 RlgI has restricted the extent to which a transport firm can! offeI using more than one mode, particularly within the same [eogr 
area. With deregulation, transport firms might try to tlivlrs ·fy li1 
forming Megra<ed, mu1'imodal compani.,, offering perlpa I r 1, I I barge, and motor carrier services simultaneously. It hls be ar] 
by eo� cha< euch compao<ea coulrl provide <r�por< eerLicl. ore I 
cheaply, especially since they would have incentives to chlo e the 
most efficient form of transportation required to rende� a l s rvicj 
This would obviously involve an expansion of the produdtioh 
activities of existing firms, some of which may be att�tld lthrou 
mergers. Antitrust enforcers may be confronted by a dJcislort as 
co whe<her <hie <ype of divereificacion ie c�eoo�< �<h l 
competitive market structure, and if so, whether a move tolajd 
such a structure can be accomplished by the entry of ejistlnd firm 
into other modes without mergers. 
:e 
d 
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7 .  CONCLUSION 
We have attempted to describe the role of antitrust in a 
deregulated environment. We have focused on new trends and problems 
that will confront antitrust enforcers, drawing numerous examples 
from the industries most likely to be affected by deregulation. An 
examination of the trend of deregulation for a number of industries 
shows that no single form of deregulation can truly be viewed as 
typical. Accordingly, the role of antitrust will vary from industry 
to industry. 
If any single theme has emerged as dominant, it is this : 
The most complex problems will arise in those industries in which 
deregulation is partial. tn these cases, the social control of an 
industry creates policy problems that may find neither mutual 
exclusion nor collective exhaustion in the course of regulation and 
antitrust. In short, there is a danger that regulators and antitrust 
enforcers will fight over jurisdiction in some important matters, 
while other important problems receive the attention of neither. 
One important policy question that will have to be settled 
is whether existing agencies have the requisite jurisdiction and 
powers to create an effectively competitive environment. If not, 
perhaps existing agencies will require new authority, more resources, 
and new remedies. While it is not presently obvious whether and to 
what extent such changes will be needed, we have pointed to the 
types of questions that will be most important in signalling the need 
for change. First, who will scrutinize the price at which one firm 
sells goods or services to an affiliated firm, especially when only 
one of the firms is regulated? Second, who will detenhine W: 
price in a regulated market is predatory or otherwise lntlco 
particularly if the firm charging that price �lso servls l t 
market? Third, what will be the boundary of antitrustlinJuri 
Fourth, under what conditions will a merger involving fJrril . I ,both regulated and unregulated markets be allowed, and lwho s
these conditions? Fifth, have regulations created structjra
condition• '""' ptacticea that c�ttibute tu cu�ciuualt p�a 
behavior? And sixth, who will decide when a refusal to sJrv
illegal, particularly if the sale in question invorves bojh 
j 
en a: 
.. t1..... . gula 
ty? 
serv;: I eci 
lel 
is 
. I regulated and unregulated firms? In the text we have suggested 
circumstances in selected industries under which each bf Jhese 
dilemmas might actually occur. I ' 
, 
Whether deregulation is partial or not, the first task 
of antitrust enforcers will be to determine whether sttucjurhl 
change is required to prevent the exercise of un�ecke1 ejonbmic 
power by firms now unaccountable to regulators. Strucburll rhang. 
may be necessary to foster competitive markets, particl1aJ1y whejl �tijrust I regulation has created highly concentrated markets. enforcers must expect two new types of defense: (1) that Ith 
market shares for which structural relief is sought wai ttiru . I I ' upon existing firms by regulators, and (2) that structtiral r 
is unnecessary, since deregulation will by itself natu}a1ly 
the market shares of larger firms. 
t
lal 
lie, 
rode 
encounter 
We have also emphasized that antitrust enforfementlwil] 
a number of practices antithetic to the creatioJ ahd 
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maintenance of competitive markets , practices that are deeply 
ingrained in the fabric of the industries being deregulated. It 
will not be easy for antitrust to overcome the inertia of decades 
of sanctioned collusion and monopoly .  Some o f  the institutions 
at the heart of the regulated system must be eliminated with 
deregulation, including domestic rate bureaus in transportation 
industries where price and entry are decontrolled. Even then 
antitrust enforcers must watch closely to ensure that behavior is 
independent, especially where other institutions , such as 
international conferences , continue to exist .  
Finally, antitrust enforcers must constantly watch for 
any obstacles that impede free entry where free entry is desirable. 
Deregulation by fiat does not guarantee free entry in fact . 
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